General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation

Glenn C. Loury, Sen, Debapriya, Muto, Shigeo, Ana I. Saracho, Full references including those not matched with items on IDEAS Most related items These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one. Mukherjee, Arijit, Zhao, Dan, Nisvan Erkal, You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:vyip See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

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Together they form a unique fingerprint. View full fingerprint. Games and Economic Behavior , 59 1 , Sen, Debapriya ; Tauman, Yair. Further, the private value of the patent is increasing in the magnitude of the innovation, while the Cournot price and the payoff of any other firm fall below their respective pre-innovation levels.

Sufficiently significant innovations from an outsider innovator are licensed exclusively to a single firm. Otherwise, all other firms, except perhaps one, become licensees. The dissemination of the innovation is generally higher with an incumbent innovator compared to an outsider.